Where the moralist leaves off, there the theologian begins; where the physicist ends, the physician begins; and where the political scientist ceases, the jurist begins. For reasons cf homogeneity, we must not leap readily across boundaries and limits, carrying from cognate arts what is only peripheral to our own. Prudence and an acute and penetrating judgment are indeed required to distinguish among similar things in these arts. It is necessary to keep constantly in view the natural and true goal and form of eaoh art, and to attend most carefully to them, that we not exceed the limits justice lays down for each art and thereby reap another' s harvest. We should make sure that we render to each science its due (suum cuique) and not claim for our own what is alien to it. 4 In one respect, Althusius is not saying anything wholly new here. From the time of the ancient Creeks, on tlrrough the middle ages, philosophers, theologians, and scientists had been concerned to differentiate their different disciplines. This concern was especially evident in the scholastic attempt to differentiate and relate philosophy and theology. But in another respect, Althusius is revealing something which was new with the Renaissance and the Reformation, for Althusius organized his Politics according to Ramist logic -that is, the logical method of Peter Ramus. 5 This logic was different from that of Aristotle, though of course not wholly unrelated to it. Herman Dooyeweerd, a contemporary Dutch philosopher of law and politics in the same Calvinist line as Althusius and Kuyper, points out that Ramus' logic was not rooted in the Aristotelian syllogism but in definitions and postulates, the material of which was found in the empirical sciences themselves. 6 Carney explains that Ramus' law of justice (lex justitiae) "indicates that each art or science has its own purpose, that this purpose serves as a principle for determing what is proper to a given art (suum cuique), and that everything not proper to it is to be rigorously excluded." 7
Influenced by Ramus, Althusius was seriously attempting to discover the legitimate territory for political science, as distinguished especially from jurisprudence.
How far one may proceed in political science is sufficiently indicated by its purpose. This is, in truth, that association, human society, and social life may be established and oonserved for our good by useful, appropriate, and necessary means. Therefore, if there is some precept that does not oontribute to this purpose, it should be rejected as heteronomous . . . . Now the politicaI scientist properly teaches what are the sources of sovereignty (capita maje8tatis), and inquires and determines what may be essential for the constituting of a commonwealth. The jurist, on the other hand, properly treats of the right (im) that arises at certain times from these sources of sovereignty and the oontract entered into between the people and the prince. 8 Because this is stated so clearly, Friedrich feels that the greatest shortcoming of Cierke's study was in his failure to emphasize the distinetion between the '1egal" and the "political" in Althusius' thinking.
Indeed, Gierke tended to identify politics and its axioms with the law of nature. This identification is oontrary to Althusius' fundamental tenets... Gierke also identifies politics with public law. This identification is even less in keeping with Althusius' view. To Althusius, politics was a descriptive science of facts. Ibid. Friedrich says, " ... against all inspirationalism and supematuralism he [Ramus] asserts that 'the starting point of all human knowledge of whatever kind is the sensuous experience and the induction from single instances'." PMB, p. Ixi.
